Donald Trump’s first 100 days in office as the 47th President of the United States disrupted traditional pillars of US foreign policy and created a new geopolitical reality for NATO-allies. The Scandinavian countries are all committed Atlanticists. Denmark, Norway and Iceland are among the founding members of NATO in 1949, while Finland and Sweden joined in 2023 and 2024 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. All five countries were part of the Western bloc during the Cold War, and all of them cultivated stronger relations with the American superpower after the Cold War.
For small states, seeking shelter and status with stronger partners have been among the most popular strategies after the Cold War to compensate for limited diplomatic, economic and security capacity (Thorhallsson and Steinsson 2023; Carvalho and Neumann 2014). This is thought to be particularly important in times of crisis. However, the first 100 days of the second Trump Presidency tells a different and more critical story highlighting the adverse consequences for small states finding themselves as “the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship, unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on [their] own” (Wivel, Bailes and Archer, 2014: 9). At the same time as the Nordic countries sought to navigate Russia’s war in Ukraine, the United States was reframing and redefining the nature of the US-Nordic relationship to be less a relationship of sovereign equals and more a relationship of a patron and its clients.
At the same time as the Nordic countries sought to navigate Russia’s war in Ukraine, the United States was reframing and redefining the nature of the US-Nordic relationship to be less a relationship of sovereign equals and more a relationship of a patron and its clients.
How did the Nordic countries respond? To answer this question, we analyzed 577 articles, comments, official statements and video clips from decision-making actors in governmental positions (Prime Ministers, Presidents, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Defense) in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland from President Trump’s inauguration on January 20th and the following 100 days until April 30th. We focused exclusively on statements regarding the Ukraine War, a useful lens for identifying responses to the Trump presidency, since all Scandinavian countries regarded the war as an imminent security crisis.
Our mapping of initial Nordic responses to the second Trump presidency highlights the agency of small states, even in times of crisis and security dependency. It also illustrates how small states may present different visions from those of the great powers. In terms of policy content, the analysis has two main findings: First, all five countries moved towards Europe and support of a stronger European voice in the region’s own security affairs, while emphasizing that this may take many different forms. While the content and strength of their critique against the US administration vary, they all see a need for reducing dependence on the US. Second, the Nordic countries continued their strong support for Ukraine as they had done during the Biden administration despite shifting US policies.
A stronger role for Europe
The statements from Nordic policymakers not only highlight the importance of ‘Europe’. They also disclose an increasing plurality in what ‘Europe’ is and ought to be. They communicate an inclusive understanding of European agency including increased Nordic-Baltic cooperation, a stronger role for the EU, a stronger European voice in NATO and continue to emphasize solutions for all of Europe, not leaving Ukraine or other states alone as buffer states between great power spheres of influence.
They communicate an inclusive understanding of European agency including increased Nordic-Baltic cooperation, a stronger role for the EU, a stronger European voice in NATO and continue to emphasize solutions for all of Europe, not leaving Ukraine or other states alone as buffer states between great power spheres of influence.
Denmark finds that the US security commitment must be supplemented with a more independent role for Europe, while Norway sees a bigger role for Europe inside NATO, and Icelandic decision-makers reconsider EU membership as response to Europe’s geopolitical shift. Swedish policymakers underline the importance of a closer EU-integration on security and defense, not NATO, as vital for a lasting peace in Ukraine, and they see an increased role for Scandinavia, the Baltic countries, and Poland in a new European security architecture. The Finnish government argues that Europe must take more responsibility for its own security, but also that NATO must play a larger role. Finland supports Ukraine’s claim to EU membership by 2030 and argues that EU spending on increased military strength should be directed to frontline countries such as Finland.
Continued strong support for Ukraine
In the midst of a security crisis and continued security dependence, the Nordic countries demonstrate a surprising degree of foreign policy agency. While there are variations in the intensity and content of their policies, they share a strong commitment to the support and defence of Ukraine seeing this as a collective responsibility of Europe and of importance, not only for their own national security but for upholding a rules-based international society. This provides strong contrast, not only to Russia, but also to the policies of the Trump administration.
Danish government ministers stress Denmark’s willingness to use a higher level of its GDP on defence expenditure as a necessary contribution to the security and defence of Europe and Denmark and as a moral obligation. The same solidarity can be found in both Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The latter two countries are more critical of the US, while Finnish decision-makers emphasize the need for both European and Nordic-Baltic cooperation and view the Finnish president, Alexander Stubb’s, friendship-like relation with President Trump, e.g., playing golf together, as an asset in this regard.
A small state solution for the European security architecture?
The five Nordic countries showed a remarkable degree of agency and resilience during the first 100 days of the second Trump presidency. While there were variations in both policies and communication styles, they all saw an increasing necessity for European solutions to shared security challenges and saw both moral and security reasons for strongly supporting Ukraine. Differences did not reflect historical positions on the transatlantic partnership but current geopolitical challenges. The previously most pro-US country, Denmark, now facing a direct challenge from the US administration over the North Atlantic security order, was increasingly critical of US policy towards Ukraine and Europe. In contrast, the two Nordic countries sharing a border with Russia expressed little critique of the US administration. Historically cautious Finland was most positive towards the US President and expressed a stronger belief in continued US commitment to Europe and Norwegian government ministers stressed that a continued American engagement in Europe and Ukraine would be a reliable way to secure peaceful relations with Russia and supported a US mineral agreement with Ukraine. For all five Nordic countries, European agency and resilience was accompanied with some degree of pragmatism vis-a-vis the US administration.
Still, we can identify the contours of a small state approach to the European security order. First and most fundamentally, Nordic arguments on Ukraine took their point of departure in an understanding for security as indivisible. The national securities of individual countries – in particular the security of small states – were viewed as closely interlinked in the sense that Ukrainian security could not be separated from Nordic security or European security more generally. Second, the Nordic countries approached the solution to the current security challenges in Europe, not as the choice of one grand solution over another, but as a series of layered and overlapping solutions combining Nordic-Baltic cooperation with a stronger EU and European activism inside NATO. Finally, the Nordics believed they could make a difference. Their agency was based not primarily on material strength but on a particular understanding of the role of small states in European politics: that they could make a difference and that they had a right to make a difference.
References
de Carvalho B, Neumann I.B. (eds.) (2014) Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing. Routledge.
Thorhallsson, B., & Steinsson, S. (2023). A theory of shelter: Small-state behaviour in international relations. In Agency, Security and Governance of Small States (pp. 29-48). Routledge.
Wivel, A., Bailes, A., & Archer, C. (2014). Setting the scene: small states and international security. In C. Archer, A. Bailes, & A. Wivel (Eds.), Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond (pp. 3-25). Routledge.